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ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS IN
VIRGINIA
An alimony' or child support order has a special status in the
postjudgment collection process because of the dual nature of the
award. As a decree ordering the payment of money, the support
order provides all of the legal remedies for the enforcement of a
money judgment.2 As an order fulfilling the social and moral duty
of a spouse or parent, the decree is also enforceable by a full range
of equitable remedies.' The duty aspect of the obligation avoids
state constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment for civil
debt if a delinquent spouse is found in contempt.4 It also justifies
denial of the obligor's homestead exemption 5 and denial of his dis-
charge in bankruptcy for support obligations.'
Obstacles to private enforcement of support orders, however, do
remain. The expense of locating an obligor and his assets, if they
can be located, is not always economically feasible for the private
attorney. The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (RURESA),7 which is available to a Virginia spouse seek-
ing enforcement against an obligor residing in a different Virginia
county or city8 as well as against an out-of-state obligor, has eased
some of the jurisdictional and financial barriers to enforcement.
Nevertheless, the limited time and resources available to officials
in the responding states for locating the obligor and his assets un-
dermine the effectiveness of RURESA enforcement.
This Note will examine the legal and equitable remedies avail-
able in Virginia for the enforcement of domestic alimony or child
1. Alimony is referred to in the Virginia Code as maintenance and support of the spouse.
See, e.g., VA. CODE § 20-103 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
2. A decree in equity for the payment of money has the same effect as a judgment; the
obligee therefore is a judgment creditor entitled to carry the decree into execution or to
pursue enforcement of the judgment lien on realty. Id. §§ 8.01-426 to 428 (RepL Vol. 1977).
3. Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S.E. 303 (1926).
4. See note 41 infra.
5. See notes 105-07 infra & accompanying text.
6. See notes 78-81 infra & accompanying text.
7. VA. CODE §§ 20-88.12 to .31 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
8. Id. § 20-88.28:4.
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support orders and the operation of RURESA in the enforcement
of foreign alimony or child support orders. The increased public
enforcement of support obligations under the Social Security
Amendments of 19749 and 197510 and under the parallel state leg-
islation" also will be discussed. These federal and state responses
to the ineffectiveness of private enforcement through common law
and statutory remedies aid both the welfare and nonwelfare depen-
dents who rely on support obligations.
LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Contempt
No legal process is available to enforce a decree for spousal or
child support until the installments under a periodic award be-
come due and payable. Once default occurs, however, a contempt
proceeding is the usual method of enforcement.12
A court of equity has inherent power to enforce its interlocutory
or final decrees by fine and imprisonment for contempt.'3 Because
a contempt proceeding is within the court's continuing jurisdiction
to enforce its decrees, specific reservation of this right in the de-
cree is unnecessary For the same reason, no limitation is placed on
the time within which contempt enforcement may be sought.14
In Virginia, contempt enforcement is available in several situa-
tions. In a pending or concluded suit for divorce a vinculo ma-
trimonii,15 for divorce a mensa et thoro,'6 or for separate mainte-
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 65.1-660 (West Supp. 1979).
10. Id.
11. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-249 to 290 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
12. Attorney's fees and court costs awarded in a divorce decree also may be enforced by
contempt. Eddens v. Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 50 S.E.2d 397 (1948) (awarding no spousal sup-
port in decree but enforcing attorney's fees and court costs by contempt).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 523, 50 S.E.2d at 403-04. Some conflict exists among the jurisdictions concern-
ing whether contempt is a cumulative remedy or is available only when other means of
enforcement have been exhausted. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS 468 (1968). In
Virginia, contempt is a cumulative remedy that is often the first response to noncompliance.
15. A divorce a vwnculo matrimonii is an absolute divorce, dissolving the marriage bond
and extinguishing all economic incidents of marriage such as dower and curtesy. For a list of
the grounds for divorce from the bond of matrimony in Virginia, see VA. CODE § 20-91
(Repl. Vol. 1975).
16. A divorce a mensa et thoro, or divorce from bed and board, is a judicial separation for
cause that allows the parties to live apart but leaves the marriage bond intact and extin-
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nance, the court has the power to require a recognizance upon or
after entry of a support order.17 The court may imprison the con-
temnor for failure to provide such recognizance.18 The court's con-
tempt power also extends to punishment for failure to comply with
any order or decree for support and maintenance including the fol-
lowing: 19 (1) a pendente lite order2" issued in a Virginia suit for
divorce a mensa et thoro, for divorce a vrnculo matnmonii, or for
separate maintenance;21 (2) a pendente lite order issued by a Vir-
ginia court acting as a responding state in a RURESA action;22 (3)
a final decree in a Virginia suit for divorce or separate mainte-
nance;23  (4) a foreign decree registered in Virginia under
RURESA;24 and (5) a final decree establishing a support obligation
by a Virginia court acting as a responding state in a RURESA
action. 2
5
If the terms of a valid separation agreement concerning support
are incorporated in the final divorce decree,26 the terms are en-
forceable by contempt.27 If, however, the agreement is only ap-
guishes none of the economic incidents of marriage. Because the marriage bond is not dis-
solved, the parties are not discharged from other marital obligations. Thus, under an a
mensa decree the wife is entitled to continue to receive support from the husband. For a list
of the grounds for an a mensa divorce, see zd. § 20-95.
17. Id. § 20-114.
18. Id. § 20-115.
19. Id.
20. Pendente lite order refers to an order made while the suit is pending.
21. Pendente lite orders in suits for divorce or separate maintenance are authorized under
§ 20-103 of the Virginia Code.
22. A Virginia responding court may issue a pendente lite support order and must con-
form its support order to any final decree, foreign or domestic, in a pending or prior action
for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus, adoption, or custody. Id. §
20-88.28:1. The court, however, has power to enforce its order, so conformed if necessary,
notwithstanding retention of jurisdiction for enforcement purposes by the court in the prior
action. Id. The Code further provides that all duties of support are enforceable by a pro-
ceeding for civil contempt. Id. § 20-88.20. See also notes 164, 169 infra & accompanying
text.
23. VA. CODE § 20-115 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
24. "Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same
manner as a support order issued by a court of this State. It has the same effect and
may be enforced and satisfied in like manner." Id. § 20-88.30:6. See id. § 20-88.20 (defining
how duties of support issued by Virginia courts are enforced).
25. Id. §§ 20-88.20, .24.
26. Id. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
27. McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 Va. 365, 368, 177 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1970).
The purpose of § 20-109.1 of the Virginia Code is to allow the court to incorporate any
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proved but not incorporated by the court,28 the obligee's remedy
for enforcement is limited to a contract action for damages or spe-
cific performance.29
A contempt proceeding is initiated by a written petition or mo-
tion, verified by the spouse, setting forth the terms of the award,
the amount of accrued arrearage, and a request for the issuance of
an order to the obligor to appear in court and show cause why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt.30 After notice to the
obligor, the obligee spouse also may petition the court for a deter-
mination of the amount of arrearages and for a judgment for that
sum.3 ' Because the court in which the award originally was granted
has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its decree by contempt, 2 a
valid agreement between the divorcing parties into the divorce decree to facilitate enforce-
ment of the terms of the agreement by the contempt power. Morris v. Morris, 216 Va. 457,
459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (1975) (citing McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 Va. 365, 177
S.E.2d 781 (1970)).
28. Shoosmith v. Scott, 217 Va. 789, 232 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Henebry v. Henebry, 185 Va.
320, 38 S.E.2d 320 (1946). The court in Martin v. Martin, 205 Va. 181, 135 S.E.2d 815
(1964), held that the terms of an agreement could not be enforced as terms of the decree if
the agreement were incorporated in the decree, but did not expressly order the obligor to
comply with its provisions. Section 20-109.1 of the Virginia Code was added in 1970 after
Martin to clarify any ambiguities over the effect of incorporation. This section now over-
rules the result in Martin.
29. Similarly, if a property settlement is incorporated in the decree, its terms cannot be
enforced in the same manner as a support agreement so incorporated. The obligee's remedy
to enforce a property settlement is an action on the contract. Higgins v. McFarland, 196 Va.
889, 895, 86 S.E.2d 168, 197 (1955).
Other jurisdictions conflict on the question of contempt enforcement of a property divi-
sion incorporated in the divorce decree. For example, such enforcement violates the Califor-
nia constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for civil debt. Bradley v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957). See also Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d
631, 328 P.2d 193 (1958). Washington, however, in response to a simllar constitutional at-
tack has upheld contempt enforcement of a property division based on the parties' agree-
ment if the purpose of the property division is the same as that of a support award, specifi-
cally, if the division "bears a reasonable relationship to the husband's duty to support his
wife and children." Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958). For a discus-
sion of contempt enforcement of family support obligations as imprisonment for debt, see
note 41 tnfra.
30. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN VIR-
GINIA 157 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CLE, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE.].
31. A judgment for arrearages enforces the original decree. In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 207
Va. 188, 148 S.E.2d 771 (1966), a judgment for arrearages was entered against a nonresident
husband on constructive service twelve years after he had appeared in Virginia to defend
the suit for divorce and alimony.
32. Frequently, in a suit for divorce or separate maintenance, the circuit court will trans-
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reinstatement of the original cause on the docket is unnecessary
and improper." The petition or motion is filed with the papers of
the pending or concluded suit.3 4 Usually, the petition or motion is
instituted in the name of the parties, but it may be captioned in
the style of the original cause. An order to show cause also should
be prepared for the judge's ex parte entry.
The primary defense available to the delinquent obligor in a
contempt hearing is inability, as opposed to unwillingness, to com-
ply with the support order.35 Inability to comply with the support
order is measured by the obligor's earning capacity, not his actual
income;36 therefore, inability is not a defense if the obligor is able
to pay part of the award, or if he has sufficient funds to comply
with the order but the property is exempt from creditors' claims.37
The equitable defense of laches, applicable if the obligee's delay
in enforcing the order prejudices the obligor, is rarely successful.3 8
The Virginia Supreme Court's recent rejection of the laches argu-
ment in an action for a judgment for support arrearages indicates
the continued lack of viability of the defense in the contempt
context.3 9
fer to the juvenile and domestic relations district court the enforcement of its order for
spousal or child support. VA. CODE § 20-79(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The contempt proceeding
therefore usually is brought in the juvenile and domestic relations district court.
33. Eddens v. Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 50 S.E.2d 397 (1948).
34. Two copies of the decree and the sheriff's fee for service should be left with the clerk.
CLE, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE, supra note 30, at 157.
35. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 158 Va. 647, 164 S.E. 551 (1932); Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244,
132 S.E. 303 (1926); Camden v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 115 Va. 20, 78 S.E. 596
(1913).
36. Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965) (holding increase of alimony
from $17.50 to $35 per week justified in light of unemployed husband's ability to obtain
employment and his rental income from property worth $60,000); Brooks v. Brooks, 201 Va.
731, 113 S.E.2d 872 (1960) (deeming award of $12.50 per week for alimony and $10.00 per
week for child support appropriate when husband having annual net income of only $1,800
was in "early fifties," had good health, and owned residence worth $10,000 and equity of
$7,000 in service station); Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 201 Va. 668, 112 S.E.2d 902 (1960) (holding
increase of separate maintenance award from $15 to $50.per week justified when husband
owned real and personal property worth $124,500 and had annual net business income of
$9,600).
37. H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 469.
38. Id. at 470-71.
39. In Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 494 (1979), the husband argued laches as a bar
to the wife's petition for a judgment for arrearages. The court held that the wife's "failure to
communicate with [the husband] for almost three years after his termination of the alimony
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At the contempt hearing, the judge may order the contemnor to
make periodic payments to satisfy the arrearages if the violations
are not severe. The judge, however, also may commit the contem-
nor to a state correctional institution, a workhouse, a city farm or
work squad, or the state convict road force, at hard labor, for a
fixed or indeterminate period not to exceed twelve months or until
further order of the court.40
Because of the severity of the penalty, contempt enforcement of
support obligations is both civil and criminal in nature.41 It is a
civil proceeding in that its purpose is to coerce obedience to the
decree42 or to enforce the rights of the individual for whose benefit
the award was made.43 The penalties for contempt are criminal in
nature in that they are identical to those imposed under the crimi-
nal statutes for conviction of desertion or nonsupport.44 Moreover,
payments did not justify [his] noncompliance with the alimony decree." Id. at -, 255
S.E.2d at 497 (citation omitted). See also notes 75-77 infra & accompanying text.
40. VA. CODE § 20-115 (Repl. Vol. 1975). If the contemnor is committed to a workhouse,
city farm or work squad, the person for whose benefit the decree was made receives between
$5 and $25 per week from the city or county in which the obligor performs work. Id. § 20-63
(Cum. Supp. 1979). Thus, the counterproductive effects of jailing as a means of support
enforcement, resulting from the obligor's inability to earn income during confinement, are
mitigated to a limited extent.
Before the enactment of statutes that gave a decree in equity ordering the payment of
money the effect of a money judgment and made such decree a lien on the obligor's real
estate, the penalty for contempt was seizure of the contemnor's real and personal property
under a writ of sequestration. These assets were held until the obligor paid. Hook v. Ross,
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 310 (1807).
41. A related issue is whether imprisonment for contempt is imprisonment for civil debt.
Virginia has no constitutional ban on imprisonment for debt. Nevertheless, the Virginia Su-
preme Court has stated in dictum that a support obligation is not an ordinary debt within
the meaning of such prohibitions because it is not a contractual debt, but an obligation
imposed by a court. West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S.E. 876 (1920). See also Note, Body
Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten But Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543,
550-53 (1976).
42. Eddens v. Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 50 S.E.2d 397 (1948); Gloth v. Gloth, 158 Va. 98, 163
S.E. 351 (1932).
43. Local 333B, United Marine Div. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 773, 71 S.E.2d 159 (1952).
44. VA. CODE §§ 20-61, -62 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The text of § 20-115 provides in part as
follows:
[U]pon conviction of any party for contempt of court in failing or refusing to
comply with any order or decree for support and maintenance for a spouse or
for a child or children, the court may commit and sentence such party to the
State correctional institution for women, a workhouse, city farm or work
squad, or the State convict road force, at hard labor, for a fixed or indeter-
minate period or until further order of the court, in no event however for more
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the statute authorizing the contempt remedy for support enforce-
ment uses the term "conviction."45 The Virginia Supreme Court
views contempt enforcement of support orders as a "quasi-crimi-
nal" remedy "46 it punishes the obligor for disobedience of a court-
ordered duty to uphold the power and dignity of the court.4 7
The Virginia Supreme Court has acknowledged this dual coer-
cive/punitive aspect of contempt enforcement of a support
obligation:
[A] decree for alimony is different from an ordinary debt or
judgment for money. It is an order compelling a husband to sup-
port his wife, and this is a public as well as a marital duty-a
moral as well as a legal obligation. The liability is not based
upon a contract, but upon the refusal to perform a duty. The
imprisonment is not ordered simply to enforce the payment of
the money, but to punish for the wilful disobedience of a proper
order of a court of competent jurisdiction. s
Although the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that no
comprehensive test exists that substantively classifies contempt as
either civil or criminal,49 contempt enforcement of support obliga-
tions is treated procedurally as a civil action. Accordingly, the de-
fendant debtor is not entitled to the constitutional guarantees
available in a criminal proceeding.5
The contemnor must pay all arrears before the court will enter-
tarn a motion to quash an execution issued on a support order. 1
than twelve months.
Id.
45. Id. § 20-115 (Repl. Vol. 1975). Gowen v. Wilkerson, 364 F Supp. 1043 (W.D. Va.
1973), also points out that the language of § 20-415 is similar to that of the criminal con-
tempt statute, § 18.1-292(5). See also 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 128 (1969).
46. Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S.E. 303 (1926). See also Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va.
330, 10 S.E.2d 893 (1940); Deeds v. Gihner, 162 Va. 157, 174 S.E. 37 (1934); Lindsey v.
Lindsey, 158 Va. 647, 164 S.E. 551 (1932); Camden v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp.,
115 Va. 20, 78 S.E. 596 (1913); Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 Va. 612, 73
S.E. 145 (1912).
47. West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S.E. 876 (1920).
48. Id. at 699, 101 S.E. at 877.
49. Local 333B, United Marine Div. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 773, 71 S.E.2d 159 (1952).
50. See Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 249 N.W.2d 88 (1976).
51. Hall v. Hall, 192 Va. 721, 66 S.E.2d 595 (1951). Although the husband's appeal was
dismissed on procedural grounds, the court indicated that it would have affirmed the lower
court's denial of relief to the husband on the ground of his failure to purge himself of con-
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Furthermore, although a court cannot dismiss the contemnor's bill
for divorce as punishment for contempt, it can refuse to proceed
with the action until the contemnor has satisfied all arrearages.5 2
Courts generally disfavor imprisonment for failure to pay sup-
port obligations; nevertheless, the threat of a contempt proceeding
against a Virginia debtor is a powerful tool for the obligee when
the remedy is pursued vigorously 53 The territorial limits of the
contempt power, however, often force Virginia obligees to use
RURESA procedures against absconding obligors." If deserting
obligors can be located, 5 RURESA contempt enforcement can be
effective.
Executin
A decree in equity for the payment of money has the same effect
as a money judgment at law." The obligee is a judgment creditor
entitled to enforce the decree through execution. If, however, the
decree specifies a time within which payment must be made, the
writ of execution cannot issue until the debt matures.57 Thus, in
the case of periodic alimony or child support payments, the writ
may issue only for accrued, unpaid installments." The obligee is
tempt. Id. at 726, 66 S.E.2d at 598.
52. Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 555, 153 S.E. 879, 893 (1930).
53. For a discussion of the effectiveness of jailing for contempt in the context of a vigor-
ous public system of support enforcement, see Chambers, Men Who Know They Are
Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 900 (1977).
54. A writ of ne exeat may act as a deterrent to desertion. Because in a divorce suit the
court may make any order necessary to assure compliance, issuance of a writ of ne exeat is
proper when the defendant is about to leave the jurisdiction. VA. CODE § 20-103 (Repl. Vol.
1975). A requirement under the writ is that the defendant post a bond in the nature of an
appearance bond. See A. PHELPS, DOMEsTc RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA 297 (3d ed. 1971).
55. The new federal and state parent locator services can assist in this situation. See
notes 204-07 infra & accompanying text.
56. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-426, -427 (Repl. Vol. 1975). This applies, of course, not only to do-
mastic support orders but also to foreign support orders registered in a Virginia court under
the provisions of RURESA. See Id. §§ 20-88.30:1 to 6.
57. Id. § 8.01-427 (Repl. Vol. 1977). If the decree does not specify a limit for payment,
execution is available within twenty-one days after entry of the decree. Id. § 8.01-466.
58. In Virginia, payments awarded under a support decree vest as they accrue. Cofer v.
Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 838, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965). These accrued installments are treated
as final judgments for money on which execution may issue without further action by the
court. In some jurisdictions, accrued, unpaid installments must be reduced to a judgment
[Vol. 21:881
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entitled to a writ of fierz factas as often as the installments become
due and are unpaid.5
In Virginia, execution cannot be levied on real estate." The
sheriff may levy on all tangible personal property of the debtor,
such as automobiles and other chattels, subject to applicable statu-
tory exemptions that the debtor may assert.6 ' The primary obsta-
cle to using execution to enforce the decree is locating the obligor
and his assets. For this purpose, an examination of the debtor and
third parties indebted to the debtor may be available to the obligee
under Virginia's provisions for interrogatories.2
The decree is enforced by petitioning the clerk of the court that
rendered the decree to issue a writ of fieri facias and to give the
writ to the sheriff for execution. 3 Notice need not be given to the
debtor.6 4 The writ commands the sheriff to levy and sell the
debtor's property within the sheriff's bailiwick to satisfy the ar-
rearages.65 For tangible personal property, the levy creates a lien
that is enforceable by sale of the property 66 For intangible per-
sonal property, the lien arises on delivery of the writ to the officer
for arrears before execution may issue.
59. Stephens v. Stephens, 171 Ga. 590, 156 S.E. 188 (1930); Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R.I. 27,
57 A. 1058 (1904).
60. VA. CODE § 8.01-478 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Davis v. National Grange Ins. Co., 281 F
Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1968).
61. See M. BURKS, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 360 (4th ed.
1952) (regarding property not subject to levy). Statutory exemptions in Virginia are dis-
cussed in Note, The Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, supra this issue.
62. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-506 to 510 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
The investigative work necessary to locate the obligor and his assets is often beyond the
means of the private attorney. The new state and federal parent locator services ameliorate
this problem. See notes 204-07 infra & accompanying text. For tips on data about the
debtor that can be useful in directing avenues of inquiry, see E. LUBOFF & C. POSNER, How
TO COLLECT YOUR CHILD SUPPORT & ALIMONY 11-13 (1977). The authors suggest use of such
public records as Division of Motor Vehicles driver's license and registration records, state
employment records, city or county business license records, prison records, and real estate
records. Id. at 29-53.
63. VA. CODE § 8.01-466 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Note, Enforcing Money Judgments
Against Personal Property in Virginia, supra this issue.
64. Palais v. DeJarnette, 145 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1944). In those states in which the arrear-
ages must be reduced to judgment before execution may issue, notice to the debtor and
opportunity to be heard are essential.
65. VA. CODE § 8.01-474 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
66. Id. § 8.01-479.
1980]
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and is enforceable by garnishment.67
Defenses to execution include expiration of the statute of limita-
tions and laches65 A twenty-year statute of limitations applies to
executions on a judgment or decrees for the payment of money;6 9
thus, expiration of the statute is a proper defense. The judgment
may be extended, however,7 for an additional twenty years on the
obligee's motion.71 For periodic support payments, the statute be-
gins to run on the date each installment becomes due, not on the
date of the original decree.72
A decree or judgment that has not lapsed may be revived by a
motion filed in the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which the
decree was entered requesting an order to show cause why the
judgment should not be extended After notice to the obligor and
a hearing on the motion, the court may extend the judgment.74
In revival contexts, as in other support enforcement situations,
the defense of laches is rarely successful. In Richardson v. Moore7 5
the wife, seeking arrearages from the deceased husband's estate,
filed a motion to revive a support order entered forty years earlier.
The husband had reduced the installment without court approval
when the children reached majority The court rejected the defense
of laches, reasoning that, because a subsequent private contract be-
tween the parties reducing the support obligation did not excuse
noncompliance with the decree, 76 neither could the wife's passive
acquiescence ratify the reduced payments.77
67. Id. § 8.01-501.
68. Because execution of a support decree is procedurally an action at law, the statute of
limitations constitutes the proper bar to this action. One commentator, however, suggests
that laches, an equitable defense, also may be applicable because of the inherent equitable
nature of the underlying support decree. H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 470. No Virginia cases
use the doctrine of laches to bar execution of a support decree.
69. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(A) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
70. Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 111 S.E.2d 422 (1959). Extension of a judgment by
issuance of a writ of fien factas is no longer possible. Id.
71. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
72. The commencement of a lien on the obligor's real estate also is measured from the
date each installment becomes due, with each installment creating a separate lien. United
States v. Spangler, 94 F Supp. 301 (S.D. W Va. 1950).
73. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
74. Id.
75. 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976).
76. Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E. 894 (1935).
77. Similarly, because of the importance of the children's welfare, a wife's conduct in wno-
[Vol. 21:881
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A bankrupt debtor may not assert a claim of discharge as a de-
fense because "any debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of both
spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree, or property settlement" is not dischargeable."8 The distinc-
tion between alimony and a dischargeable property division is un-
clear under the new Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.79 Formerly,
state law determined the nature of an award. 0 Under the new Act,
however, federal bankruptcy laws apply 1
Garnmishment
The garnishment process may be used to subject money held by
the obligor's debtor to satisfaction of the arrearages. Once a writ of
fieri facias has been issued, the obligee may sue out a garnishment
summons directed to the debtor of the obligor.8 2 The life of a gar-
nishment summons when issued from a general district court is
sixty days and when issued from a circuit court is ninety days.8 3 If
lation of a divorce decree does not relieve the husband of his child support obligation. H.
CLARK, supra note 14, at 513.
78. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 1979); however, for a discussion on the dischargeability
of support obligations that have been assigned, see note 221 mifra.
79. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 applies to all bankruptcy proceedings initiated
on or after October 1, 1979. 11 U.S.C.A. § 402 (a) (West Supp. 1979).
80. For example, the dischargeability of an award of attorney's fees pursuant to a divorce
decree turned on whether state law treated such awards as in the nature of alimony or
support. In re Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1976) (Illinois); Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678
(9th Cir. 1975) (California); In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974) (Texas); Damon v.
Damon, 283 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1960) (Maine); Hyman & Rice v. Knuppenburg, 422 F Supp.
274 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (Michigan).
81. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 363, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 5787. Courts have defined alimony under bankrtupcy law to mean "pay-
ments m the nature of support of a former spouse." Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304, 307
(7th Cir. 1976). See Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Baldwin, 250 F
Supp. 533, 534 (D. Neb. 1966); IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1678 (14th ed. 1975); 3A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1839 (14th ed. 1975).
If this is what is meant by the bankruptcy law that is controlling, the knotty problem of
distinguishing alimony from a property division persists.
82. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-511, -512 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See Note, Garnishment in Virginia,
supra this issue.
83. VA. CODE § 8.01-514 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The disadvantage of this short life is absent
when the federal government is the garnishee. See note 95 infra & accompanying text. This
also is overcome under the new state provisions for wage assignment and the order to with-
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the garnishee fails to appear, the court may enter a default judg-
ment. 4 In a full hearing, the court will determine the fact and the
amount of the garnishee's liability from an examination of the gar-
nishee or from his verified statement. It then may enter an in per-
sonata judgment directing the garnishee to pay such amount to the
court.85
The Virginia Code provides for garnishment of the wages and
salaries of state,"" federal,8 7 and municipal s8 employees. Further-
more, a 1978 amendment to the Code removed restrictions on the
amount of an obligor's wages that may be garnished to enforce a
support order.8 9
The recent social security amendments waive the federal govern-
ment's immunity to process for support orders. The waiver thereby
makes available to the obligees salaries and moneys "the entitle-
ment to which is based on remuneration for employment." 0 The
new federal statute provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law moneys (the
entitlement to which is based on remuneration for employment)
due from, or payable by, the United States (including any
agency or instrumentality thereof and any wholly owned Federal
corporation) to any individual, including members of the armed
services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent
as if the United States were a private person, to legal process
brought for the enforcement, against such individual, of his legal
obligations to provide child support or make alimony
payments.91
hold and deliver under the IV-D program for child support enforcement. See notes 240-50
infra & accompanying text.
84. VA. CODE § 8.01-519 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
85. Id. §§ 8.01-515, -516.
86. Id. § 8.01-522.
87. Id. § 8.01-523.
88. Id. § 8.01-524.
89. Id. §§ 8.01-512, 34-29 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (West Supp. 1979). The statute has been interpreted to include
accumulated, unpaid pension and retirement benefits, but to exclude disability payments to
a retired military officer. Elmwood v. Elmwood, 295 N.C. 168, 244 S.E.2d 668 (1978). It also
includes garnishment for attorney's fees awarded in connection with a decree for alimony or
child support. Murray v. Murray, 558 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1977).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (West Supp. 1979). See Annot., 44 A.L.R. FED. 494 (1979).
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The new statute removes the government's immunity in garnish-
ment proceedings authorized under state law; it does not confer
original subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts to deter-
mine such actions.2 In addition, because no federal law of garnish-
ment exists, the United States is subject to state law procedures.9 3
Thus, in Virginia, both a writ of fiert facias and a garnishment
summons directed to the appropriate federal official are necessary.
Pursuant to the federal statute, service of the garnishment sum-
mons is effected by certified or registered mail, return receipt re-
quested, or by personal service, on the appropriate agent desig-
nated for receipt of service. 4
The Virginia statute prolonging the life of a garnishment against
the government until arrearages are satisfied supplements this ex-
panded use of garnishment to enforce family support obligations.9 5
Thus, garnishors of the government avoid the procedural necessity
often found in other garnishment proceedings of having to renew
the summons periodically
Judgment Lien
Under Virginia's general judgment lien statute,96 a support de-
92. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, Accounting & Fin. Center, 418 F Supp.
162 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Golightly v. Golightly, 410 F Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1976); Morrison v.
Morrison, 408 F Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1976); West v. West, 402 F Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Boiling v. Howland, 398 F Supp. 1313 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). See Annot., 44 A.L.R. FED.
494, 499-502 (1979).
93. This is implied in the language that the United States is subject to garnishment "as if
[it] were a private person." 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (West Supp. 1979).
94. Id. § 659(b). The following offices may be contacted regarding service of process: U.S.
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center, AFAFC/AJQ, 300 York Street, Denver, Colorado
80205; U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center, ATTN: FINCR, Indianapolis, Indiana
46249; U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The Pentagon, Washington,
D.C. 20380; and U.S. Navy Regional Finance Center, Anthony J. Celebrezze Building, Cleve-
land, Ohio 44199.
95. VA. CODE § 70-78.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Note that the statute apparently contains a
legislative error giving it retroactive application, that is, application "to arrearages accumu-
lated prior to July one, nineteen hundred seventy-six," rather than prospective application.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
96. Id. § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Although the statute speaks of a judgment for money,
it also applies to a decree ordering the payment of money. Sections 8.01-426 to 427 give
decrees the status of a money judgment. For a discussion of the relative priorities of judg-
ment liens and other creditors' claims see Note, Judgment Liens and Priorities in Virginia,
infra this issue.
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cree constitutes a lien on the obligor's real estate located in any
city or county in which the decree is docketed.9" The lien attaches
not only to realty owned by the obligor at the time of docketing
but also to any real estate subsequently acquired. 98 Once the de-
cree is docketed in the clerk's office, it secures both present and
future installments due under the decree.9 A judgment lien is not
created by a decree that approves but does not incorporate a sepa-
ration agreement containing support provisions. 100 In this situa-
tion, the provisions are enforced by an action on the contract. In
addition, the court always has the discretion to order that the de-
cree not establish a lien on the obligor's land.10'
The lien allows the obligee to receive rents and profits from the
real estate. In a recent case,102 for example, the Virginia Supreme
Court recognized that the wife's lien on the husband's real prop-
erty included his life interest in his deceased mother's real estate.
The court also acknowledged the wife's right to invoke the court's
aid in subjecting the life interest to the payment of her judgment
by having the estate managed to maximize the income from it.103
If the rents and profits from the property are insufficient to sat-
isfy the arrearages within five years, the lien is enforceable through
a creditor's bill in equity by a sale of the property 104 The home-
stead exemption granted by the Virginia Code' 05 is unavailable as a
97. VA. CODE § 8.01-458. To maximize chances of recovery from the obligor's realty, the
decree should be docketed in all Virginia cities or counties where the obligor owns real
estate.
98. Id.
99. Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952); Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699,
172 S.E. 252 (1934); Issacs v. Issacs, 117 Va. 730, 86 S.E. 105 (1915).
100. Durett v. Durett, 204 Va. 59, 129 S.E.2d 50 (1963).
101. Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965). The policy promoted by
denying lien status is to avoid impairing the alienability of the land and thus to avoid hin-
dering the debtor's ability to pay.
102. Brauer v. Brauer, 215 Va. 62, 205 S.E.2d 665 (1974).
103. Id. at 67-68, 205 S.E.2d at 669. Any lien properly docketed prior to the support de-
cree will be superior. Jennings v. Montague, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 350 (1845).
104. VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
105. The pertinent section provides as follows:
Every householder or head of a family residing in this State shall be entitled
to hold exempt from sale under any order or process issued on
any demand for a debt or liability on contract, his real and personal property,
or either, to the value of not exceeding five thousand dollars.
Id. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979). For a discussion of the homestead exemption, see Note, The
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defense to such enforcement proceedings. The purpose of the
homestead exemption is to preserve the debtor's family from desti-
tution, 0 6 a policy that would be thwarted by allowing the obligor
spouse to claim an exemption from a support obligation. The legal
justification for denial of the exemption is that support obligations
are not contracted debts within the meaning of the exemption
statutes.'
0 7
Impressed Lien
Pursuant to an appropriate court order, a judgment or decree for
support can constitute a lien on specific real estate of the obli-
gor. 0 8 In Wilson v. Wilson, 09 for example, the court impressed a
lien for the payment of periodic alimony on the obligor spouse's
$25,000 home. Under the Uniform Partnership Act as adopted in
Virginia, 1 0 courts also have authority after the obligor defaults to
subject his partnership interest to payment of the support obliga-
tion."' This impressed lien ' 2 attaches when the order is docketed
under the statutory procedure for docketing money judgments."13
The impressed lien on specific realty differs from the judgment
lien on all of the obligor's real estate."14 The impressed lien is an
Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, supra this issue.
106. H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 472.
107. Ford v. Ford, 201 Ala. 519, 78 So. 873 (1918).
108. VA. CODE § 8.01-460 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
109. 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E.2d 605 (1954).
110. VA. CODE §§ 50-1 to 43 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
111. Section 50-28 of the Code provides as follows:
On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a part-
ner, the court which entered the judgment, order or decree, or any other court,
may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied
amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and such court may then
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other money
due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and make all other
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner might have
made, or which the circumstances of the case may require.
Id. § 50-28. Procedurally, the interest of the debtor partner is charged with a lien by serving
a copy of such an order on the copartner.
112. An impressed lien refers to a debt that has been made a charge or encumbrance on
specific property of the obligor.
113. VA. CODE § 8.01-460 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
114. See id. § 8.01-458.
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equitable lien creating security 15 for payment of the judgment; the
judgment lien is a legal lien." 6 With both the impressed and judg-
ment lien, however, foreclosure is effected by sale of the realty if
the rents and profits therefrom are insufficient to satisfy the decree
within five years." 7 After the obligor's default and before foreclo-
sure of the impressed lien, the obligee is entitled to the appoint-
ment of a receiver" 8 to collect the rents and profits from a lease of
the specific property "9 If these proceeds are insufficient to satisfy
the award within five years, foreclosure in equity follows. 120
To secure compliance with a support order, the impressed lien is
preferable to an injunction against the obligor's disposition of his
property In Trimble v. Tnmble,121 the court held that a divorce
decree should not enjoin the obligor perpetually from disposing of
or encumbering property; such a harsh measure might hamper the
obligor's ability to pay 122 The court suggested in dictum that a
115. In Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 1074, 81 S.E.2d 605, 613 (1954), the court refused
to extend the impressed lien beyond that on the home, deeming that to be sufficient to
secure performance of the alimony decree.
116. A. PHELPS, supra note 54, at 300.
117. VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
118. A court of equity has the discretionary power to appoint a receiver to take possession
of the property of a nonresident defendant. Property so held may not be interfered with, by
garnishment or other methods, without the court's consent. Thornton v. Washington Say.
Bank, 76 Va. 432, 433-34 (1882); Smith v. Butcher, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 144, 150 (1877).
Appointment of a receiver also may be requested by the spouse in an independent equity
suit for support and maintenance because in Virginia alimony is a substantive right cogniza-
ble in equity and not merely an incident of divorce. Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172
S.E. 252 (1934).
In any proceeding in which such appointment is sought, the bill must describe the prop-
erty to be put under the receiver's control. The Virginia statute also requires service of
notice on the defendant debtor and other parties with an interest in the property. VA. CODE
§ 8.01-591 (Rep. Vol. 1977). If, however, the party already has been served with process in
the suit, such notice is unnecessary. Id. § 8.01-594. If a nonresident defendant is served by
publication or by out-of-state service, he may have any appointment reconsidered if he did
not appear at the appointment hearing. Id. § 8.01-322.
119. Smith v. Butcher, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 144 (1877).
120. VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Because impressed liens are enforced in eq-
uity, there is no statute of limitations on such actions. Gilley v. Nidermaier, 176 Va. 32, 10
S.E.2d 484 (1940).
121. 97 Va. 217, 33 S.E. 531 (1899).
122. Id. at 221, 33 S.E. at 533. Although the court did not elaborate, apparently it envi-
sioned the possibility that the proceeds from a timely sale of some of the husband's prop-
erty might be his only resource for satisfying the obligation.
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lien on specific realty would have been more appropriate. 123 Use of
the impressed lien, however, may be minimal due to the express
authority of Virginia courts to require recognizance or security for
compliance.
Recognizance or Security
Upon or after entry of a support decree m a pending12 4 or con-
cluded suit for divorce or separate maintenance, 25 the court may
require the obligor to give a recognizance, with or without
surety 126 The security may be in the form of collateral or a bond
with surety.1 27 The consequences for failure to give such security
are those that attach to conviction for contempt.'28
Although recognizance provisions rarely are used, 29 they can be
valuable if the spouse attempts to conceal his assets from the di-
vorce court.130 An alternative security device is suggested by the
holding in Jenkins v. Jenkins. s13 In Jenkins, the Virginia Supreme
Court approved the withholding of the husband's share from a par-
tition of property held by the entireties as security for payment of
a support obligation. 3 2
If a recognizance with surety is required and the obligor defaults
on his support payments, the surety must satisfy the support obli-
gation; however, the surety is entitled to a writ of execution in his
123. In addition, the availability of an action to set aside as fraudulent a conveyance of
property to avoid support enforcement makes an injunction unnecessary. The obligee may
join the transferee as a party to a divorce suit, and the court may adjudicate the rights of
the parties and charge a lien on the property. Crowder v. Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 99 S.E. 746
(1919); Gollehon v. Gollehon, 123 Va. 504, 96 S.E. 769 (1918).
124. VA. CODE § 20-103 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
125. Id. § 20-114.
126. Id.
127. A. PHELPS, supra note 54, at 290.
128. Compare VA. CODE § 20-115 (Repl. Vol. 1975) with id. §§ 20-61 to 62.
129. CLE, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE, supra note 30, at 158. In Canavos v. Canavos, 205
Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965), however, the Virginia Supreme Court used this remedy in
lieu of charging a lien on the spouse's real estate.
130. Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E.2d 471 (1946). In Ring, the court in dictum sug-
gested that a recognizance was the proper alternative remedy by holding that the trial court
lacked equity jurisdiction to impound the husband's stock as security for compliance with
alimony and child support awards. Id. at 277-78, 38 S.E.2d at 475.
131. 211 Va. 797, 180 S.E.2d 516 (1971).
132. Id.
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name against the obligor from the court that entered the support
order.13 3
Attachment
Accrued, unpaid support payments are a debt within the mean-
ing of the attachment statute. An obligee spouse therefore should
be able to use the prejudgment remedy of attachment at or after
the commencement of an action to reduce the support arrearages
to judgment if one of the six statutory grounds for attachment ex-
ists.134 These grounds generally relate to situations in which the
obligee is unable to serve the obligor personally, fraud is claimed,
or the obligor is about to or has secreted or disposed of his assets
to defraud his creditors.13 5
Procedurally, attachment is commenced by filing a sworn peti-
tion that states the details of the debt and a sum certain to which
the obligee is entitled.1' A specific statutory ground for attach-
ment must be alleged and a prayer for attachment included.1 7 The
issued attachment directs the sheriff to attach the property and to
summon the obligor to appear and answer the petition.3 8,
Although attachment creates a lien on property 3 9 giving the ob-
ligee leverage to secure payment from the obligor, its primary dis-
133. VA. CODE § 49-27 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
134. A. PHELPS, supra note 54, at 279.
135. VA. CODE § 8.01-534 (Repl. Vol. 1977) lists the six specific grounds as follows:
1. Defendant is a foreign corporation, or a nonresident, with debts owing to
such defendant in the city or county in which the attachment is.
2. Defendant is leaving or is about to leave the state with intent to change his
domicile.
3. Defendant is removing, is about to remove, or has removed from the state
the specific property sued for or such amount of his estate that insufficient
property will be left to satisfy the judgment.
4. Defendant is converting, is about to convert, or has converted his property
into money, securities or other evidences of debt with intent to hinder, delay or
defraud his creditors.
5. Defendant has assigned or disposed of, or is about to assign or dispose of
some or all of his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.
6. Defendant has left or is about to leave the state, or has concealed himself
from creditors, or is a fugitive from justice.
136. Id. § 8.01-537 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 8.01-456 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
139. Id. § 8.01-557 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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advantage is the expense of the required bond m an amount
double the fair market value of the seized property 140 For the obli-
gee spouse in need of delinquent support payments, the cost of su-
ing out an attachment may be prohibitive. 141
REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
(RURESA)
Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Support Orders
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted restrictively
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, a
court must give full faith and credit to a foreign support decree
based on subject matter and personal jurisdiction only if the de-
cree is final and nonmodifiable. 142 Thus, a court asked to enforce a
foreign support decree first must determine whether the award is
final under the law of the state of the rendering court. For periodic
support, some states require docketing of a judgment for arrear-
ages before unpaid, accrued installments become final.14s In others,
including Virginia, these installments automatically become a final
judgment debt on accrual.144 Furthermore, m most jurisdictions fu-
ture installments are modifiable; consequently, full faith and credit
is not mandated. The obligee then must wait until sufficient ar-
rearages have accrued to pursue out-of-state enforcement or en-
gage in expensive, piecemeal enforcement efforts.
Comity Recognitin of Foreign Support Orders
The finality requirement for enforcement of a foreign decree
under the full faith and credit clause has led to an increased reli-
ance on comity for support order enforcement.145 Comity recogni-
140. Id. §§ 8.01-551 to 552. The bond is required to protect the obligor against damages
caused by wrongful seizure. Harris v. Lipson, 167 Va. 365, 189 S.E. 349 (1937).
141. Whether it is in fact prohibitive will depend on such factors as the amount of the
debt, and in turn, the value of the seized property and the likelihood of collection.
142. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
143. H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 475-76.
144. See note 58 supra.
145. See H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 278-80 (discussing comity recognition of foreign
decrees). Comity recognition circumvents the effects of a broad reading of Fall v. Eastin, 215
U.S. 1 (1909), which asserts that equity act decrees, such as one ordering the conveyance of
property located in another state, are not entitled to full faith and credit.
1980]
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tion avoids duplicative litigation and also prevents evasion of sup-
port obligations. Evasion is blocked when, under comity principles,
a court recognizes a foreign support order and enters a domestic
decree on the same terms. This makes contempt and other reme-
dies available and allows the obligee to enforce the obligation as
effectively in the foreign state as in the rendering state.
Virginia and many other jurisdictions have recognized the im-
portance of comity in support enforcement. 146 Recently, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court interpreted Virginia's adoption of the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act as mandating comity
recognition of a foreign support decree ordering payments that
were both retroactively and prospectively modifiable.147 In uphold-
ing a judgment for arrearages on a Maryland decree, under which
the payments were modifiable retroactively, the court in Alig v.
Alig 14' relied on the provisions of RURESA declaring modifiable
support duties enforceable 49 and declaring foreign decrees en-
forceable in the same manner as Virginia decrees. 150
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
Because of restrictive full faith and credit requirements and be-
cause of the difficulty and expense of obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion over an absconding obligor,'15 1 RURESA has become the more
effective way to enforce a foreign support decree. 52 The Act repre-
146. Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 494 (1979); Scott v. Sylvester, No. 78-0176 (Va.
Aug. 30, 1979); Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974); McKeel v. McKeel,
185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946).
147. Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 494 (1979); Scott v. Sylvester, No. 78-0176 (Va.
Aug. 30, 1979).
148. 220 Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 494 (1979).
149. VA. CODE § 20-88.13(14) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
150. Id. § 20-88.30:6(a).
151. Obtaining personal jurisdiction may no longer be the barrier it once was. By a 1978
amendment, the Virginia long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the obligor in a cause of
action arising from a spousal or child support order rendered by a Virginia court in a di-
vorce suit. Id. § 8.01-328.1(A) (8) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
152. Id. 20-88.12 to 31. URESA has been adopted in some form by all states except New
York. New York has adopted the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, N.Y. DOMESTIC RE-
LATION LAW §§ 30-43 (West 1973), which is substantially similar to RURESA and permits
reciprocity between various jurisdictions. RURESA also has been enacted in a number of
U.S. territories. Adopting jurisdictions are as follows (asterisk indicates adoption of the Re-
vised Uniform Act in some form): ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 4-80 to 98 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§
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sents the adopting state's choice to give full faith and credit to
foreign support orders and establishes a procedural framework for
interstate cooperation in the establishment and enforcement of
support orders. The Virginia version of RURESA now also pro-
vides for use of its enforcement mechanisms by Virginia obligees if
the obligor resides in a different Virginia county or city. 53 Because
filing fees and costs are paid by the obligor,"" the obligee can bet-
ter afford to pursue enforcement of the support duty. Enforceable
under the Act is any duty of support existing or imposable under
the laws of the state in which the obligor was present for the pe-
riod for which support is sought.155 Support duties include those
25.25.010 to .270 (1977); A.S. CODE §§ 901-1075 (1973) (American Samoa); *AIz. REv. STAT.
§§ 12-1651 to 1691 (1956); *ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2401 to 2449 (Cum. Supp. 1979); *CALIF.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1699 (West 1972); *CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to 143 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-327 to 355b (1975); DaL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 601-638 (Rev. 1974); D.C.
CODE §§ 30-301 to 324 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 88.011 - .3711 (West 1964); GA. CODE §§
99-9016 to 919b (1976); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 576-1 to 41 (Repl. Vol. 1976); *IDAHO CODE §§ 7-
1048 to 1089 (Cum. Supp. 1979); *ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 101-142 (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE
§§ 31-2-1-1 to 2-1-39 (1973); IOWA CODE §§ 252A.1 - .12 (1969); *KAN. STAT. §§ 23-451 to
493, 4,100 (1974); *Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 407.010 - .480 (Cum. Supp. 1978); *LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:1641 - :1699 (West 1968); *ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 331 - 420 (West 1964); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 89C, §§ 1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (Michie
La. Co-op 1970); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 780.151 - .174 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.41 -
.53 (West 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-11-1 to 65 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 454.010 - .360
(1977); *MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-5-101 to 257 (1979); *NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-762 to
7,104 (1978); *NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 130.010 to .370 (1973); *N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 546:1 to
:41 (1974); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:4-30.1 to .22 (1952); *N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-6-1 to 41
(1978); *N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to 32 (Repl. Vol. 1976); *N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-12.1-01
to 43 (1971); *OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3115.01 - .34 (Repl. Vol. 1972); *OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 1600.1 - .40 (West 1961); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 110.005 to .291 (Repl. Part 1975); *42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6741 - 6780 (Purdon Supp. 1979); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3311-
3313v (1968) (Puerto Rico); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-11-1 to 37 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 20-7-110
to 470 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-9-1 to -31 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-901
to 929 (Repl. Vol. 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1 §§ 21.01 - .66 (Vernon 1975); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-61a-1 to 39 (1978); *VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 385-428 (1974); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 391-429 (1964) (Virgin Islands); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.21.010 - .910
(1961); *W VA. CODE §§ 48-9-1 to 42 (Repl. Vol. 1976); *Wis. STAT. § 52.10r (1957); *WYo.
STAT. §§ 20-4-101 to 138 (1977).
153. VA. CODE § 20-88.28:4 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
154. Id. § 20-88.22:01. These fees and costs do not have priority over amounts due the
obligee. Id.
155. Id. § 20-88.18. The Virginia Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of this
provision. Scott v. Sylvester, No. 78-0176 (Va. Aug. 30, 1979), involved an action under
RURESA to register a foreign support order and to recover arrearages thereunder. The trial
court had held that § 20-88.18 of the Code of Virginia prohibited a Virginia court from
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under temporary or final orders in a suit for divorce or separate
maintenance and any arrearages of support.156
RURESA is primarily a procedural framework within which a
Virginia resident 157 can establish a support duty or enforce an ex-
isting one against an out-of-state obligor or an obligor residing in a
different city or county in Virginia. 58 To establish a support duty,
the obligee files a petition in the juvenile and domestic relations
district court where she resides containing the name and last
known address of the obligor, the circumstances of the obligor and
his dependents for whom support is sought, and any information
that might help locate the obligor.159 After a determination by the
reviewing court that the petition sets forth facts indicating that
the obligor owes a support duty, the petition is certified and trans-
mitted to the appropriate court of the responding state. 60 In the
responding state, the obligor is notified of the docketing of the
cause. The Commonwealth attorney or the equivalent official in
the responding state has the duty to locate the obligor or his prop-
erty and to prosecute the case.'16  At the hearing, the defendant
may raise any defense available under the responding state's
law."'62 If the responding court finds a duty owing, it enters an or-
der requiring payment of the obligation to its clerk of court, who
forwards the order to the initiating court for disbursement to the
obligee.' 6 ' To assure compliance with the order, the responding
enforcing a Maryland decree except as to arrears that accrued while the defendant was in
Virginia. The supreme court reversed, explaining that § 20-88.18 is a conflict of laws rule
that applies only when the request for support is not based on a foreign decree. The applica-
ble provision in the registration action at issue in Scott declared a registered foreign decree
to have the same effect as a Virginia support order. VA. CODE § 20-88.30:6(a) (Repl. Vol.
1975).
156. VA. CODE §§ 20-88.13(6), .13(14) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
157. The Act also authorizes the state to initiate proceedings when it has provided assis-
tance to the dependent. Id. § 20-88.19. See also notes 220-25 infra & accompanying text.
158. VA. CODE § 20-88.28:4 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
159. Id. § 20-88.21.
160. Id. § 20-88.22. The appropriate court is that where the obligor resides. Id. If the
obligor's residence is unknown, the petition is sent to the state information agency of the
responding state which attempts to locate the obligor and then forwards the petition to the
proper court. Id.
161. Id. § 20-88.23.
162. Id. § 20-88.23:2. The hearing may be continued to allow for testimony by depositions
regarding controverted issues. Id.
163. Id. § 20-88.24.
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court may require recognizance, demand the obligor to make peri-
odic payments and personally report to the clerk, and use con-
tempt proceedings if the obligor fails to comply."6 4 In addition, the
court of any county or city in which the obligor is present or owns
property has the same powers to enforce the order as the court
that entered it. 165
An existing support duty under a foreign decree may be enforced
in Virginia under the registration provisions of the Uniform Act.
These provisions also may be used to enforce an existing support
duty under a domestic Virginia decree in a foreign state. In the
foreign decree situation, the obligee effects registration by trans-
mitting to the appropriate clerk of court in Virginia three certified
copies of the foreign court order and any modifications, plus a veri-
fied statement containing the obligor's last known post office ad-
dress and residence, the obligee's address, the amount of arrear-
ages, the description and location of any leviable property of the
obligor, and the names of other states in which the order is regis-
tered. 6 The clerk then notifies the obligor of the registration 67
and the registration is confirmed if the obligor does not petition to
vacate the registration within twenty days.168 Confirmation gives
the order the same effect as if it had been rendered in the respond-
ing state.169 If the obligor petitions to vacate, the obligee is repre-
sented by the Commonwealth attorney. 70 The obligor may raise
any defense available in Virginia to the enforcement of a foreign
money judgment.17 1
Civil and criminal 7 2 enforcement remedies under RURESA sup-
164. Id. § 20-88.26.
165. Id. §( 20-88.24.
166. Id. § 20-88.30:5(a).
167. Id. § 20-88.30:5(b).
168. Id. § 20-88.30:6(b).
169. Id. § 20-88.30:6(a).
170. Id. § 20-88.30:4.
171. Id. § 20-88.30:6(c). The obligor cannot contend that the decree is not entitled to full
faith and credit. By adopting the Uniform Act, the responding state extends full faith and
credit even to nonfinal, modifiable support duties. Cf. Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 494
(1979) (holding that the Uniform Act mandates comity recognition to retroactively modifi-
able support decree).
172. For criminal prosecution provisions under RURESA for failure to provide support,
see VA. CODE §§ 20-88.16, .17 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See also td. § 20-61 (criminal proceedings
for nonsupport).
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plement other remedies. 17 3 Coordination of any RURESA action
with support orders in other pending proceedings against the obli-
gor is provided for in the Code of Virginia. The responding court is
directed to proceed with the reciprocal action even when another
marital, adoption, or custody action is pending.174 If, however, the
other action concludes before the RURESA hearing175 and provi-
sion was made for the support sought in the RURESA proceeding,
the responding court must conform its order to the amount so
awarded. 7  The responding court may enforce fully its own sup-
port order even if the court in the other action retains jurisdic-
tlon.' 77 Thus, the obligee's enforcement opportunities are enlarged.
The Act further provides that an order in the RURESA proceeding
does not nullify and is not nullified by another support order in a
reciprocal action within or outside Virginia.17 8 Again, the availabil-
ity of a number of outstanding support orders in different jurisdic-
tions expands the obligee's collection avenues.
Although the Uniform Act was intended to eliminate, through
interstate cooperation, the drain on state welfare funds caused by
unenforced support orders, obstacles to effective enforcement re-
main. State information agencies to locate the obligor do exist;'79
however, once the obligee's petition is forwarded to the responding
court, the Commonwealth attorney must locate the obligor and his
assets and prosecute. 80 RURESA actions in a busy Commonwealth
attorney's office often are given low priority Moreover, a Common-
wealth attorney may be reluctant to prosecute if enforcement
173. Id. § 20-88.14.
174. Id. § 20-88.28:1.
175. When establishing a support duty, this RURESA hearing on the petition is author-
ized by § 20-88.23 of the Code of Virginia. In a registration situation, this RURESA hearing
on the obligor's motion to vacate is authorized by § 20-88.30:6(c) of the Code of Virginia.
Note that in the registration situation, the responding court must stay enforcement of the
registered order if the obligor proves that an appeal from the order is pending or that execu-
tion has been stayed. Id.
176. Id. § 20-88.28:1.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 20-88.28:2. Money paid by the obligor for a particular period under a support
decree rendered by another state is credited against the obligor's liability for that period
under the Virginia decree. Id.
179. Id. § 20-88.15:1.
180. Id. §§ 20-88.23, .23:1.
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would force the obligor onto the responding state's welfare rolls. 181
Thus, the effectiveness of RURESA is impeded by heavy caseloads
and continued provincialism.
THE NEW FEDERAL ROLE IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Although the federal government made earlier efforts to increase
public enforcement of child support obligations,8 2 the Child Sup-
port and Establishment of Paternity Amendments of 1974181 and
1975184 to Title IV of the Social Security Act dramatically in-
creased the role of the federal government in this area. These
amendments also called for increased state enforcement of child
support obligations.
The amendments are designed to enforce the support obligations
owed by absent parents, to establish paternity, and to obtain child
support.18 5 Because of the burgeoning welfare expenditure of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,8 ' the
legislation sought to reduce total welfare expenses by implement-
ing a cost effective program for enforcing family support obliga-
tions.1 87 Three main features of the amendments include the man-
date for state programs for child support enforcement, the
181. Federal court jurisdiction is now available under certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C.A. §
652(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979). See notes 202-03 infra & accompanying text. This could allevi-
ate the problem at least in the child support enforcement area.
182. For highlights of these efforts and the legislative history of the current provisions,
see OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 5-11
(1976). See also J. CAssErrY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY 7-14 (1978); Bernet, The
Child Support Provisions: Comments on the New Federal Law, 9 FAm. L.Q. 491, 492-98
(1975).
183. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-660 (West Supp. 1979).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 651.
186. See Bernet, supra note 182, at 497; Locker, Enforcement of Child Support Obliga-
tions of Absent Parents - Social Services Amendments of 1974, 30 Sw. L.J. 625, 632
(1976).
187. The program apparently has achieved its cost-effectiveness goal. See Rich, Runaway
Fathers Program Proves a Major Success, Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 2. One
commentator, however, has questioned the relevance of the cost-effectiveness rationale and
suggested instead that greater federalization of child support enforcement should be under-
taken as a "fundamental function of society." Under this view, parental responsibility is a
duty that should be enforced per se, without regard to economic considerations. J. CAsE'rry,
supra note 182, at 97-99, 110-12.
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establishment of a Federal Parent Locator Service, and the waiver
of sovereign immunity allowing garnishment of federal salaries in
the enforcement of support obligations. 8 '
Under the amendments, states are primarily responsible for
child support enforcement by establishing a state office for child
support enforcement designed to locate absent parents, establish
paternity, and establish and collect support obligations.18 9 The De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare establishes standards
for state programs, 190 monitors and evaluates the programs,' 9' pro-
vides technical assistance, and assists in locating absent parents.192
State programs are required to be statewide, to involve state
financial participation, and to provide for the establishment of a
separate organizational unit that undertakes establishment of pa-
ternity, securing and collecting support,193 and parent location.'9 4
The state also must cooperate with other states in parent location,
in paternity determination, and in securing compliance with a
court order. 95 Finally, the state program's services must be made
available to non-AFDC families on a fee and cost basis. 16
To assist in the collection of support by the state agency, the
state plan must require as conditions of AFDC eligibility that the
188. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 652, 653, 659 (West Supp. 1979).
189. Id. § 652.
190. Id. § 652(a)(1).
191. Id. § 652(a)(4). State programs are audited annually. The state receives reimburse-
ment from the federal government for seventy-five percent of its expenses in operating the
plan. Id. § 655. If a state fails to meet minimum standards of effectiveness, it is penalized by
a five percent reduction in federal reimbursements. Id. § 603(h). On the other hand, states
receive an incentive bonus if a local authority determines paternity or collects child support
payments, which results in recoupment of AFDC payments to the family. Id. § 658.
192. Id. § 653.
193. Support payments must be made to the states and not directly to the family. Id. §
654(5). This institutionalization of the support process may prevent the creation of a sense
of paternal responsibility and satisfaction from compliance and thereby may act as a disin-
centive for such compliance. Comment, Federal Law and the Enforcement of Child Sup-
port Orders: A Critical Look at Subchapter 4 Part D of the Social Security Amendments
of 1974, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHG. 23, 36 (1976).
194. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West Supp. 1979).
195. Id. Reciprocal arrangements with other states and with the federal courts when nec-
essary, are to be utilized in the enforcement process.
196. Id. § 654(6). In addition, a state may continue to collect support payments for up to
three months after an AFDC recipient goes off public assistance and may prolong services
beyond the three months for a fee and costs. Id. § 657(c).
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applicant furnish her social security number, l"' assign her support
rights to the state, e19  and cooperate in establishing paternity and
securing support payments."" The amount of the debt owed by the
obligor to the state by virtue of the assignment of the support right
is determined by an existing court order or, in the absence of a
decree, by the state in accordance with a formula approved by
HEW200
If the amount due is based on a court order and all state en-
forcement efforts fail, a federal statute authorizes referral of the
matter to the Secretary of the Treasury for collection by tax collec-
tion methods.20 1 Another statute also confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts to entertain a support enforcement action certified
by the Secretary of HEW without regard to the amount m contro-
197. Id. § 602(a)(25)(A). One commentator has attacked this provision as involving an
invasion of the welfare parent's privacy rights. Comment, supra note 193, at 33-35.
198. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
199. Id. § 602(a)(26)(B). The parent is denied assistance for refusal to cooperate. Aid to
the child, however, still is provided by protective payments. Id. This provision was criticized
widely. Fear of physical reprisal from putative and deserting fathers could deter mothers
from applying for AFDC. Locker, supra note 186, at 638. In the 1975 amendment Congress
exacted a "good cause" exception under which assistance is not denied for failure to cooper-
ate. 42 U.S.C.A. § 208 (West Supp. 1979). Comment on the general rule, however, has re-
mained generally negative. See J. CAss-ry, supra note 182, at 109; Bernet, supra note 182,
at 513-15.
This provision has other faults. The uncooperative mother, in all likelihood, will continue
to receive the children's "protective payments" with her welfare check even though payment
to a third party technically is required. Thus, the mandatory cooperation provisions inure to
the children's detriment. Comment, supra note 193, at 31.
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 656 (West Supp. 1979). The Virginia Code authorizes the state Depart-
ment of Welfare to establish a scale of suggested minimum contributions that may be used
in fixing the amount of the obligation. VA. CODE § 63.1-286 (Curn. Supp. 1979). See also
note 222 infra.
Under the United States Code, the amounts of monthly installments collected are re-
tained by the state to offset welfare assistance payments for that period, with reimburse-
ment to the federal government for its share of participation. Any excess, up to the amount
of the support order for that period, goes to the family. If funds remain, the state and
federal governments are reimbursed for past assistance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 657(b) (West Supp.
1979).
201. Id. § 652(b). See also 26 id. § 6305 (West Supp. 1979). The tax collection process
begins with a notice to the obligor of assessment of liability and demand for payment pursu-
ant to § 6303 of the Internal Revenue Code. In the case of a first assessment against an
obligor under a court order, collection is stayed for a period of sixty days following the
notice and demand. I.R.C. § 6305(a)(4). Thereafter, the obligor's property is subject to levy
and distraint. Id. § 6331. Wages subject to a garnishment judgment for support however are
exempt from levy. Id. § 6305(a)(3).
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versy 202 Such certification is possible after a federal court deter-
mines that another state has not undertaken to enforce the
originating state's court order against the absent parent within a
reasonable time and that use of the federal courts is the only rea-
sonable method of enforcing the order.203
The amendments further require HEW to establish the Federal
Parent Locator Service. Established within the child support unit
of HEW, this service provides information, such as the most recent
address and employment of a deserting parent, gained from the
files of any participating state or from virtually any federal
agency 20 4 The service is available to a state or local official with
support enforcement authority, a court with support order author-
ity, or an agent of a deserted, nonwelfare child.205 Although the
Federal Parent Locator Service is available to non-AFDC parents
for a fee,2 °s the request for such service must be channeled through
the state agency after the state agency's efforts at location have
failed.20 7 The third main feature of the amendments, discussed
previously, is the provision allowing garnishment of federal salaries
to enforce not only child support obligations but also spousal sup-
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979). Federal courts, however, may decline
jurisdiction on the premise that domestic relations is an area of state court expertise. Com-
ment, supra note 193, at 31-32.
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979).
204. Id. § 653(b). Although it never announced a definitive stance on the matter, the
ACLU expressed concern at the legislative stage about the invasion of the absent father's
privacy rights through use of the parent locator service. See J. CAssnrry, supra note 182, at
14.
The constitutional infirmity has been attacked by others. Id. at 109; Bernet, supra note
182, at 519-21; Locker, supra note 186, at 639-42; Schulman & Rinn, Child Support and
the New Federal Legislation, 46 J. KAN. B.A. 105, 114 (1977); Comment, supra note 193, at
33-35. President Ford also expressed his reservation about this aspect of the legislation
when he signed the bill. 11 WEEKLY COMPILATION OP PRESmENTIAL DocUMENTs, no. 2, at 20
(January 13, 1975).
205. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 653(c)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1979).
206. Id. § 653(e)(2). The National Organization for Women lobbied vigorously for the
inclusion of this provision. It noted that initial support awards, if granted on divorce, often
are msufficient to meet the needs of middle-class women. Moreover, deficient state enforce-
ment penalizes the wife who cannot afford private attorney's fees for an enforcement action
but does not qualify for legal aid. Hearings on S. 1842, S. 2081 Before the Senate Comm. on
Fin., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1973).
The failure to extend such services to non-AFDC persons may violate the equal protection
provisions of the United States Constitution.
207. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(f) (West Supp. 1979).
19801 FAMILY SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 909
port payments. 20 8
THE VIRGINIA CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
In Virginia, the problem of nonsupport of children by an absent
parent paralleled the nationwide problem of growing AFDC ex-
penditures.20 9 As a result of a study authorized by the Virginia
General Assembly in 1973,210 the Virginia Public Welfare and As-
sistance Law211 was enacted.
The Bureau of Support Enforcement, a division of the Virginia
Department of Welfare, has been established to implement the
mandates of Title IV-D of the Social Security amendments.212 The
Bureau has seven regional offices.213 Field investigators and other
regional staff members directly contact the obligors to secure vol-
untary compliance with the support duty The Bureau's adminis-
trative staffs14 develops statewide policies and procedures, provides
technical assistance to the regional staff, collects and disburses
support funds, operates the state Parent Locator Service,215 and
oversees interstate support enforcement.218
The Virginia Public Welfare and Assistance Act specifically rec-
ognizes past inadequacies of common law and statutory remedies
for support enforcement2 17 and grants the Bureau extensive ad-
208. Id. § 659. See notes 90-94 supra & accompanying text.
209. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare data indicates that in 1971 only
13.4% of all AFDC families received any support payments from the absent parent. A 1973
study by Virginia's Bureau of Research and Reporting of the Department of Welfare and
Institutions reveals a 12.5% figure for Virgia AFDC families. REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF
WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S.
Doc. No. 23, at 9 (1974).
210. S.J. Res. 125, 1973 Va. Acts 1326.
211. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-249 to 290 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Thus, the legislation to carry out the
federal mandates of the 1974 social security amendment was enacted in Virginia before the
authorization of federal funding for state programs.
212. Id. § 63.1-287.
213. Regional offices are located in Richmond, Falls Church, Virginia Beach, Roanoke,
Lynchburg, Verona, and Abingdon.
214. Bureau headquarters, housing the administrative staff, are located in Richmond.
215. VA. CODE § 63.1-287(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
216. Id. § 63.1-287.
217. The Act's preface states as follows:
Common-law and statutory procedures governing the remedies for enforcement
of support for financially dependent minor children and their caretakers by
responsible persons have not proven sufficiently effective or efficient to cope
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mmistrative powers that go beyond current judicial remedies for
support enforcement.21 Services provided by the Bureau include
the location of absent parents, establishment of paternity, and es-
tablishment, enforcement and collection of child support obliga-
tions.219 The means of establishing and enforcing child support
payments depends on the existence of a court order against the
absent parent.
In all situations, the applicant must assign her support rights to
the state to be eligible for receipt of AFDC. 220 Thereafter, any pay-
ment of public assistance to the family constitutes a debt owed to
the state by the absent parent. 21 If a court order exists, the debt is
limited to the amount of the court order; otherwise, the debt is
established administratively 2 22 Upon assignment, the Bureau is
with the increasing incidence of financial dependency. The increasing workload
of courts and the Commonwealth's attorneys has made such remedies uncer-
tan, slow and inadequate, thereby resulting in a growing burden on the
financial resources of the State
Id. § 63.1-249.
218. These remedies supplement existing judicial enforcement procedures. Id.
219. Because the goal of the federal and state legislation is to reduce AFDC budgets, child
support is the focus of the enforcement program. According to John B. Tyler of the Policy
Division of Virginia's Bureau of Support Enforcement, the Bureau also will collect alimony
if a single decree imposes alimony and child support obligations. Interview with John B.
Tyler, Policy Division, Bureau of Support Enforcement, in Richmond, Virginia, Aug. 9, 1979
[hereinafter cited as Interview].
220. VA. CODE § 63.1-105.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This provision also contains the other
federally-mandated eligibility requirements, specifically, furnishing the social security num-
ber and cooperating in paternity determination. Failure to comply with these requirements
is a misdemeanor. Id. § 63.1-278 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
221. Id. § 63.1-251. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, a support debt that has
been assigned is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
Thus, bankruptcy can preclude the state's recovery right. This change in the bankruptcy
law has been criticized as "jeopardiz[ing] the continuing viability of the AFDC program and
at the same time giv[ing] tacit encouragement to parents who seek to avoid their duty to
support their dependents." Williams v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 529 F.2d
1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted) (holding under the old bankruptcy provisions
that a support debt owed to the state because of assignment under a state IV-D program
was not dischargeable).
222. VA. CODE § 63.1-251 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This court decree also determines the inter-
vals of payment for the debt. In administrative determinations of the support debt, a
formula based on the responsible parent's income may be used. Id. § 63.1-286. The scale of
suggested minimum contributions developed by the State Department of Welfare
include[s] consideration of gross income, authorize[s] an expense deduc-
tion for determining net income, designate[s] other available resources to
be considered, consider[s] the amount of assistance which would be paid
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subrogated to the rights of the AFDC recipients to pursue any ac-
tion, legal or administrative, to recoup the debt.223 In the court or-
der situation, the money judgment is deemed to be in favor of the
Bureau,224 and payments made are redirected at the Bureau's re-
quest from the court to the Bureau while the assignment is in
effect.22 5
If the collection of the court-ordered support is in jeopardy,226
the Bureau may proceed with administrative or judicial means of
enforcement.227 In the typical court decree situation, the Bureau
will take no action before this time unless the rendering court pre-
viously had requested the Bureau to proceed with administrative
enforcement. 22s Also, if collection is in jeopardy, the formality of
the Bureau's intervention varies. A field investigator simply may
notify the clerk of court of the noncompliance or may petition the
court for authority to proceed.229
Service of a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility initi-
ates administrative action in both court and no-court order situa-
tions.23 ° In the latter case, service of the notice is necessary to es-
tablish the administratively determined obligation. The notice is
to the child and caretaker under the full standard of need of the Department's
plan for aid to dependent children, and speciflies] the circumstances
which should be considered in raising or reducing such contributions including,
but not limited to, earnings potential, reasonable necessities, ability to borrow,
existence of other dependents or special hardships of the responsible person, as
well as the needs of the child and caretaker.
Id.
A field investigator typically contacts the responsible parent for an interview in which
financial data are gathered and the amount of the debt established. Interview, supra note
219.
223. VA. CODE § 63.1-251 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
224. Id.
225. Id. § 63.1-279.
226. Because the clerk of the juvenile and domestic relations district court is required to
review nonsupport cases monthly and the Bureau does its own monitoring, theoretically any
noncompliance will be acted on promptly.
227. VA. CODE § 63.1-266 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
228. The Bureau reports that cooperation with Virginia courts is generally good, with
courts frequently requesting the Bureau to use its administrative remedies. The Bureau also
assists courts through the Parent Locator Service. The Department of Corrections cooper-
ates with the Bureau by providing the names of prisoners on work release, which the Bureau
will check for names of obligors. Interview, supra note 219.
229. Id.
230. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-252, -253 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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served on the absent parent by the sheriff or by registered mail. It
contains a demand for payment within twenty days and notifica-
tion of the administrative actions that may be taken to collect the
obligation."' If no court order exists, the absent parent may file an
answer within twenty days of service setting forth any defenses.3 2
An appeal from the notice of support debt is heard before an ad-
ministrative hearings officer, with the right to an appeal de novo to
the juvenile and domestic relations district court.233
Twenty-one days after service of the notice of debt,23 4 the Bu-
reau may assert a lien on all the real or personal property of the
debtor by filing a statement with the clerk of the circuit court of
the jurisdiction in which the property is located.23 5 This lien grants
the Bureau the priority of a secured creditor.23 6 The Bureau also
may serve a copy of the lien on anyone holding earnings, bank de-
posits, or balances of the debtor in order to prevent transfer or
release of these assets.37 The holder of the debtor's property may
be held civilly liable for the full amount of the support debt if he
fails to comply with the support lien.23 8 The support lien thereby
encumbers disposition of the property while a support debt is ow-
Mg. 2 9 Tactically, support liens are filed and served at the outset of
all cases to prevent disposition of valuable property and to pre-
serve the Bureau's power to obtain reimbursement through foreclo-
sure should the obligor resist other less severe measures.
After freezing the obligor's assets, the Bureau will attempt to se-
231. Id. § 63.1-252.
232. Id. § 63.1-253.
233. Id. § 63.1-268. Jurisdiction is in the juvenile and domestic relations district court of
the district in which the obligor resides or in which he has real or personal property.
234. When collection of a court-ordered obligation is in jeopardy, liens may be filed and
served without regard to the twenty-day period. Id. § 63.1-266.
235. Id. § 63.1-254. The lien attaches on the date of filing. The scope of the lien includes
all real property and all personal property located in the jurisdiction in which the lien is
filed, except such property as is exempt from distraint, seizure, and sale under other provi-
sions of the Virginia Code. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. § 63.1-255. Service is in the manner prescribed for services of a warrant in a civil
action or by certified mail. Cf. id. § 8.01-502 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (listing requirements for valid
notice to third party who owes debt to judgment debtor).
238. Id. § 63.1-258.
239. Fifty percent of the obligor's disposable earnings, however, are exempt. Id. § 63.1-
257.
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cure a voluntary wage assignment from the obligor.2" This assign-
ment, which is the Bureau's only means of collecting current sup-
port, is irrevocable by the obligor and must be honored by any
employer of the debtor.24 1 Thus, it is superior to a garnishment
summons, which has a limited life and cannot -bind successive
employers.
If the obligor is uncooperative, the Bureau can use the stricter
administrative remedies at its disposal.2 42 The order to withhold
and deliver, a special kind of garnishment action, may be issued by
the Bureau and served on any person in possession of the debtor's
property, including his earnings.243 During the twenty-day period
within which such person must answer the order, the property
must be withheld. At the expiration of that period, the property
must be delivered to the Bureau244 pending final determination of
liability.24" If a support lien or an order to withhold and deliver is
outstanding, however, fifty percent of the debtor's disposable earn-
ings is exempt from garnishment and may ,e disbursed to the
debtor.2 " The nonexempt portion goes to the Bureau,247 which ac-
quires priority over other creditors of the debtor.248 Unlike the lim-
ited civil garnishment action,249 the order remains in effect until
the entire support debt has been collected.250
In extreme situations, the Bureau may subject the property on
which a support lien has been filed to distraint, seizure, and
240. The Bureau will not act if the court prohibits an assignment. Interview, supra note
219. The field investigator normally negotiates with the obligor to arrive at a plan for satis-
faction of the support debt. Id.
241. The "requirement to honor the assignment of earnings and the assignment of earn-
ings itself shall continue in force and effect until released in writing by the Director" of
the Department of Welfare. VA. CODE § 63.1-272 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
242. Judicial action is also available. See notes 257-61 infra & accompanying text.
243. VA. CODE § 63.1-256 (Cum. Supp. 1979). A copy also is served on the debtor.
244. The Bureau also may order delivery to the court. Id.
245. The holder who violates the order to withhold and deliver is subject to civil liability
for the amount of the support debt. Id. § 63.1-258.
246. Id. § 63.1-257.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 63.1-256.
249. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
250. VA. CODE § 63.1-256 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Service of an order to withhold and deliver
frequently compels the absent parent to reconsider a voluntary wage assignment. Interview,
supra note 219.
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sale.2 51 After posting a public notice and giving notice to the debtor
and other persons with a known interest in the property, the Bu-
reau may conduct a sale of the property and credit the proceeds to
the delinquent account. 52 Any excess, which ordinarily would be
refundable to the obligor, may be subjected to distraint, seizure,
and sale for sums that accrue after the first proceeding.2 53
A suit to foreclose a support lien through judicial sale is also
available to the Bureau.254 The action is brought in the circuit
court of the jurisdiction in which the property is located and in
which the lien is docketed. 5 If the proceeds of the sheriff's sale
are insufficient to satisfy the support debt, the Bureau receives a
deficiency judgment enforceable under the same execution, 256 an
advantage unavailable to other judgment creditors.
In addition to its administrative remedies, the Bureau may pur-
sue through the Commonwealth attorney the following judicial ac-
tions on behalf of AFDC recipients: (1) obtain or enforce a support
order;25 (2) advise the court in divorce and separate maintenance
suits of the support debt owed to the state;25 (3) seek modification
of a divorce or separate maintenance decree to include or increase
a support award if the AFDC parent is unable to employ private
counsel for this purpose; 2 9 (4) seek an order against divorced or
legally separated parents to show cause why a support order
should not be entered or increased or why the parent should not be
held in contempt for noncompliance with an order;260 and (5) initi-
ate any other civil proceedings necessary to secure
reimbursement.261
251. VA. CODE § 63.1-261 (Cur. Supp. 1979). State exemption laws, however, do apply.
See Note, The Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, supra this issue.
252. VA. CODE § 63.1-261 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 63.1-262.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. § 63.1-281(1).
258. Id. § 63.1-281(2). This should aid the court m fixing an adequate support award. The
possibility of dependents being forced onto AFDC because of inadequacy of support
awards, even if the obligor complies, is thereby forestalled.
259. Id. § 63.1-281(3).
260. Id. § 63.1-281(4).
261. Id. § 63.1-281(5).
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The Bureau's interstate functions262 include preparing cases for
a RURESA action when the Bureau chooses the judicial enforce-
ment route, assisting other states in parent location, and working
directly with other Title IV-D agencies. In the latter instance, in
response to a request from another IV-D agency, the Bureau will
apply its administrative remedies against obligors who have fled to
Virginia.2 63 Thus, if the obligor locates in a state with a IV-D pro-
gram allowing administrative remedies, such interagency coopera-
tion expands significantly the avenues of collection beyond those
available under RURESA. Furthermore, because IV-D agencies,
unlike the prosecutors who handle RURESA matters, engage only
in support enforcement activities, interstate enforcement is given
high priority.
A person ineligible for public assistance may use the Bureau's
parent location, support collection, and paternity determination
services for a fee.264 Thus, a private attorney may use the locator
service on behalf of his nonwelfare client2 65 and then proceed with
judicial remedies. Alternatively, the nonwelfare parent may rely
wholly on the Bureau's services. Support enforcement thereby be-
comes more economical for the client.
Virginia's child support enforcement program furthers public
policy in several significant respects. For fiscal year 1977, the pro-
gram reported collections of $5.37 million and expenditures of
$3.85 million.266 Location of an absent father and a determination
that his ability to pay support exceeds the assistance grant fre-
quently will enable the wife and children to cease receiving AFDC.
262. Id. § 63.1-287.lThe Bureau also is investigating the possibility of international reci-
procity. Interview, supra note 219.
263. Interview, supra note 219.
264. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-287(2), (8) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The costs of this service also is
added to a standard fee. Although based on income, the fee in any case will not exceed $45.
Interview, supra note 219. No federal financial participation currently exists for this aspect
of the IV-D program. The initial participation of the federal government terminated Sep-
tember 30, 1978. 42 U.S.C.A. § 655 (West Supp. 1979).
265. The attorney follows the same application procedures for such services as those pro-
vided for the nonwelfare client. The Bureau also has assisted private attorneys by communi-
cating with other IV-D agencies to provide the attorney with information necessary to effect
out-of-state service on the absent parent. Interview, supra note 219.
266. OFFICE OF CHMD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30,
1977, at 79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SECOND ANNUAL REPORT].
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The location of absent parents also facilitates possible family rec-
onciliation.267 Furthermore, the determination of paternity may
entitle the children to inheritance rights. Finally, a strong support
enforcement system deters evasion of support obligations and en-
courages an attitude of social responsibility among those owing
family support obligations.
Despite the program's success in improving the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of support enforcement, problems remain. The Bu-
reau's non-AFDC services are underutilized. In 1977 the Bureau
reported only three non-AFDC matters in its caseload. 268 Increased
efforts are needed to inform non-AFDC families about the availa-
bility of these services. Some observers expect the Title IV-D pro-
gram to expand rapidly once the benefits of public enforcement
become widely known.269
Although the Bureau's expanded administrative remedies ac-
count for much of its success, the administrative approach also
poses difficulties. Territorial restrictions limit effective administra-
tive remedies. For example, if a runaway father is located, begins
payment under a wage assignment, and then absconds to another
state, the Bureau must begin its efforts anew. Because the struc-
ture of IV-D programs for each state varies and because all IV-D
programs are inexperienced, the mechanics of cooperation at the
interagency level are uncertain. If the father absconds, for exam-
ple, a RURESA action may be the only alternative if the new state
lacks administrative remedies comparable to those in Virginia.
Moreover, the Bureau has not yet developed guidelines or profiles
for determining which cases are best suited for judicial, as opposed
to administrative, handling.271 Time and experience, however, will
cure many of these troubles. Meanwhile, the IV-D program repre-
sents a substantial improvement over existing enforcement reme-
267. Although the divorce rate m Virginia has climbed during the few years of the IV-D
program's existence, field investigators have witnessed such reconciliations. Interview, supra
note 219.
268. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 266, at 79.
269. Interview, supra note 219. See also J. CAsszrry, supra note 182, at 98, for a specific
proposal for complete public enforcement of support, including a mechanism similar to tax
withholding in the absent parent situation.
270. Interview, supra note 219.
271. Id.
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dies. Virginia courts should avail themselves of the program's ser-
vices, perhaps by transferring enforcement matters to the Bureau
after the entry of a support order in a divorce or separate mainte-
nance suit, in the way a circuit court currently transfers enforce-
ment to the juvenile and domestic relations district court.2 Such
use, coupled with increased use by nonwelfare persons, would cre-
ate a more comprehensive public enforcement system.
CONCLUSION
The common law and statutory remedies available to the obligee
for enforcement of a support order reflect the special nature of the
order as a social and moral duty. Contempt enforcement and the
consequent imprisonment of the obligor are harsh equitable reme-
dies available to other judgment creditors only for the obligor's
failure to appear for interrogatory proceedings, 27 3 but not for the
obligor's failure to satisfy the judgment. Other advantages given
the support order obligee in the postjudgment collection process
include removal of monetary restrictions on wage garnishment, de-
nial of the obligor's homestead exemption, and denial of the obli-
gor's discharge in bankruptcy for support obligations. Neverthe-
less, the existing remedies are inadequate. A jailed contemnor
cannot fulfill support obligations. In addition, support obligations
can be avoided by concealing or removing leviable assets from the
court's jurisdiction. Moreover, RURESA interstate enforcement
often is ineffective because the authorities of the responding state
do not always carry out their enforcement duties diligently.
The new federal and state child support enforcement legislation
removes family support obligations from this traditional but defi-
cient judicial enforcement scheme. The federal government's
waiver of sovereign immunity for the garnishment of federal sala-
ries manifests the need for forceful responses to the support eva-
sion problem. In Virginia, the uncooperative obligor whose family
has assigned its support rights to the state under the IV-D pro-
gram will face swift, harsh, administrative collection tactics. Fur-
thermore, once the mechanics of IV-D interagency cooperation are
established, the IV-D program will provide advantages over private
272. VA. CODE § 20-79(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
273. Id. § 8.01-508 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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RURESA actions because IV-D officials, unlike Commonwealth at-
torneys, engage only in support enforcement activities.
The proven effectiveness of the new federal and state child sup-
port enforcement programs indicates that increased public en-
forcement of all family support obligations is possible. Virginia has
continued to provide its program's services to nonwelfare persons
despite the lack of federal financial participation in this effort.
These services, however, are underutilized and financial participa-
tion is required for a more comprehensive public support enforce-
ment system. In the meantime, Virginia's program offers needed
child support services.
JANE F VEHKO
